In a historical overview, Cristian S. Calude, Elena Calude, and Solomon Marcus identify eight stages in the development of the concept of a mathematical proof in support of an ambitious conjecture: we can express classical mathematical concepts adequately only in a mathematical language in which both truth and provability are essentially unverifiable. In this essay we show, first, that the concepts underlying their thesis can, however, be interpreted constructively; and, second, that an implicit thesis in the authors' arguments implies that the Halting problem is solvable, but that, despite this, the probability of a given Turing machine halting on a random input cannot be assumed to define a Dedekind real number.
Introduction
In an arXived paper ( [Ca01] , v2), "Passages of Proof", Cristian S. Calude, Elena Calude, and Solomon Marcus conjecture that:
Reason and experiment are two ways to acquire knowledge. For a long time mathematical proofs required only reason; this might be no longer true.
As the basis for their belief, they identify eight stages in the development of the concept of a mathematical proof:
(a) The first period was that of pre-Greek mathematics, for instance the Babylonian one, dominated by observation, intuition and experience.
(b) The second period was started by Greeks such as Pythagoras and is characterised by the discovery of deductive mathematics, based on theorems.
(c) ... with Galilei, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, the mathematical language became more and more a mixed language, characterized by a balance between its natural and artificial components. ... This was the third step in the development of mathematical proofs. (g) The seventh period belongs to the second half of the 20 th century, when algorithmic proofs become acceptable only when their complexities were not too high.
(h) With the eighth stage, proofs are no longer exclusively based on logic and deduction, but also empirical and experimental factors.
What is proof?
The authors then ask, rhetorically, ( [Ca01] , v2):
What is a mathematical proof ? At a first glance the answer seems obvious: a proof is a series of logical steps based on some axioms and deduction rules which reaches a desired conclusion. Every step in a proof can be checked for correctness by examining it to ensure that it is logically sound. In David Hilbert's words: "The rules should be so clear, that if somebody gives you what they claim is a proof, there is a mechanical procedure that will check whether the proof is correct or not, whether it obeys the rules or not."
They note, however, that:
In 1976, Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken proved the 4CT (Four Colour Theorem) ... No human being could ever actually read the entire proof to check its correctness ... "The real question is this: If no human being can ever hope to check a proof, is it really a proof ?"
The authors' perception of the relation between truth and provability is reflected in their comments:
... Godel's incompleteness theorem (GIT) which says that every formal system which is (1) finitely specified, (2) rich enough to include the arithmetic, and (3) formal system satisfying all three conditions in GIT, then the set of true and unprovable statements is topologically "large" (constructively, a set of second Baire category, and in some cases even "larger"). 2 We note that this is an instance of the standard interpretation of Gödel's seminal 1931 paper [Go31a] that may be arguably definitive; if we apply the standard Deduction Theorem of first order logic to Gödel's meta-proof of his Theorem VI in the cited paper, then we can, reasonably, argue that his formal system P is omega-inconsistent. Theorem VI would, in such case, hold vacuously, and the incompleteness of P would not, then, be a consequence.
Prima facie, under the standard interpretations of classical 3 mathematical theory, which the authors seem to implicitly assume ( [Ca01] , v2), the above remarks can be taken to imply that the authors accept mathematical truth as being unverifiable effectively. It follows that there could, then, be any number of (equally reasonable) ways of responding to their question:
... what does it mean to be a "true arithmetical statement"?
However, in their attempt to offer an ambitious interpretation of classical theory, the authors do not address the question:
Can such latitude in the perception of fundamental meta-mathematical concepts such as truth and provability reflect a basic ambiguity in our definitions of foundational mathematical concepts?
On the contrary, the authors seem to be comfortable with the, implicitly Platonic, suggestion that classical concepts of mathematical proof, and even truth, might actually lie beyond the ambit of direct intuitive cognition! They conclude that ([Ca01], v2):
If we accept the above assumptions about the biological and physical nature of proofs, then there is little 'intrinsic' difference between traditional and 'unconventional' types of proofs as i) first and foremost, we have not access to truth, ii) correctness is not absolute, but nearly certain as mathematics advances by making mistakes and correcting and re-correcting them ..., iii) non-deterministic and probabilistic proofs do not allow mistakes in the applications of rules, they are just indirect forms of checking ... which correspond to various degrees of rigour, iv) the explanatory component, the understanding 'generated' by proofs, while extremely important from a cognitive point of view, is subjective and has no bearing on formal correctness.
... more research will be performed in large computational environments where we might or might not be able to determine what the system has done or why ... The blend of logical and empirical-experimental arguments are here to stay and develop.
... There are many reasons which support this prediction. They range from economical ones (powerful computers will be more and more accessible to more and more people), social ones (sceptical oldsters are replaced naturally by youngsters born with the new technology, results and success inspire emulation) to pure mathematical
(new challenging problems, wider perspective) and philosophical ones (note that incompleteness is based on the analysis of the computer's behaviour). (ii) Formal mathematical object: A formal mathematical object is any symbol for an individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter that is either a primitive mathematical object, or that can be introduced through definition into a formal mathematical language without inviting inconsistency.
Interpreting classical mathematical theory
(iii) Mathematical object: A mathematical object is any symbol that is either a primitive mathematical object, or a formal mathematical object. (Thus, the Algorithmic Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is effectively decidable algorithmically in an interpretation M of a formal system P, then, first, R is expressible in P, and, second, the predicate letter R, and all the elements in the domain of the relation R, are necessarily mathematical objects.)
Standard interpretations may admit ambiguity
Moreover, the vagueness, and implicitly implied non-constructivity, alluded to in
Mendelson's remarks may simply reflect, and result from, the non-specification of an effective method for determining that the infinity of intuitive assertions, which are implicit in Tarski's definition of the truth of a formula of a formal system under an interpretation, are, indeed, instantiationally verifiable. 
Some consequences of a constructive interpretation
The significance of constructively interpreting foundational concepts and assertions of classical mathematics is that:
(i) The Algorithmic Church Thesis implies that a formula [R] is P-provable if, and only if, [R] is algorithmically true in some interpretation M of P.
(ii) The Algorithmic Church Thesis implies that if a number-theoretic relation R(x) is algorithmically satisfied in some interpretation M of P, then the predicate letter "R" is a formal mathematical object in P (i.e. it can be introduced through definition into P without inviting inconsistency).
( 
Mathematical proof and non-algorithmic effective methods
Accordingly, a more appropriate definition of mathematics and mathematical proofwhich can be seen, prima facie, as a unifying thread in all the eight stages sought to be identified as distinct by the authors in ([Ca01], v2) -would be:
Mathematics is a language where proof is the yardstick for unambiguous expression and communication.
Non-algorithmic effective methods: Gödel oracles
To see the raison d'etre, and possible significance, of such a paradigm shift -from seeing mathematics as an expression of relations between a universe of abstract objects, to viewing it solely as a language of unambiguous communication -we note that, broadly speaking, Gödel's meta-reasoning (which is constructive and intuitionistically Hence, the arithmetical sentence R(n) can be effectively asserted as true, for any natural number n, by Tarski's definition of the "truth" of the arithmetical predicate R(x) under the standard interpretation M of PA.
However, because of meta-lemma (ii), there is no effective method for determining a PAproof of the string [(Ax)R(x)], since such a proof does not exist. Hence, there is no guarantee of an algorithm such that, given any natural number n, it will determine that the sentence R(n) is true under the standard interpretation M. Such an algorithm would, of course, be guaranteed if [(Ax)R(x)] were PA-provable.
12 For "relation R(x)", read "proposition (Ax)R(x)".
13 This is actually an implicit meta-lemma in Theorem VI of Gödel's seminal 1931 paper [Go31a] .
14 This, too, is an implicit meta-lemma in Theorem VI of Gödel's seminal 1931 paper [Go31a] . 15 For "meta-theorem", read "meta-lemma" in this section.
The intended thesis, here, is, thus, that meta-lemma (ii), in fact, implies that there is no algorithm such that, given any natural number n, it will determine that the sentence R(n)
is true under the standard interpretation.
In other words, we may replace the classical Turing Thesis: The reason: The unprovability of the PA-string [(Ax)R(x)] means that we could never formally prove that a Turing machine, (algorithm) T(R), that computes the arithmetical predicate R(x), when seen as a Boolean function, will halt and return true on every input.
In fact, in view of meta-lemmas (i) and (ii), the Arithmetic Provability Thesis implies that any such T(R) will loop for some natural number k, even though R(k) is true.
The significance of this is that an Arithmetic Provability Thesis also implies that the standard Turing Thesis does not hold, since Gödel's oracle is, then, an effective (nonalgorithmic) method that is not classically Turing-computable.
By Occam's dictum, and since there is no loss of generality in replacing the classical Turing Thesis with an Arithmetic Provability Thesis, the replacement is to be preferred.
The above is, essentially, the argument for introducing constructive Gödel oracles, so that we may extend the scope of effective methods to include non-algorithmic effective methods by means of an Algorithmic Turing Thesis.
Defining Tarskian truth verifiably
The significance of replacing the classical Church Thesis by Instantiational and Al;gorithmic Church Theses lies in the fact that, without these, there is no explicit convention for asserting Tarskian truth unambiguously.
For instance, one reason why Turing oracles may, so far, be viewed as offering theoretical, rather than effective, solutions to constructive problems of Theoretical
Computer Science (such as, say, the Halting problem), could be that they are deeply Now, the three significant points to note here are that Tarski implicitly assumes:
(ii) there is some language, accessible to us, in which F(s) is expressible for any s of M;
(iii) this is a language in which we can verify that F(s) holds for any s of M;
(iv) there is some effective method to verify that F(s) holds for any element of M.
Hence, if we seriously intend to make our mathematical language precise and unambiguous, then:
(v) we should introduce these assumptions explicitly as premises in Tarski This is, essentially, the reasoning behind the introduction of constructive definitions of classical concepts such as "mathematical object", "instantiational / algorithmic effective methods", "instantiationally true/computable predicates/functions", "Instantiational / Algorithmic Church Thesis", etc.
Prima facie, it seems that the Algorithmic Turing Thesis, as expressed earlier, is actually a theorem that follows from the introduction of these definitions. However, it may, in fact, be an additional thesis, and it is not immediately obvious whether the Instantiational / Algorithmic Church Theses should be treated as definitions or theses. Now, we note that, if we leave (ii), (iii), and (iv) as implicit, hence undecided and ambiguous, then we are immediately prevented from making constructive assertions that would invalidate non-constructive interpretations of PA. We could, then, develop nonconstructive interpretations that are not necessarily claimed as valid or meaningful, but, by default, simply as valid, and possibly meaningful, till shown otherwise.
However, if we tolerate such ambiguities, then we are in danger of shortchanging scientific disciplines for whom mathematics is, essentially, a language of reliable, and verifiable, external expression and communication. Such a language should, clearly, be based on notions of formal truth that offer a maximum of precision in, and verifiability of, its assertions, with a minimum of ambiguity.
For most scientific disciplines, the authority of the standard interpretations of classical mathematics is seen, and accepted -perhaps with some element of reluctance, since such acceptance occasionally flies against the grain of observation and experience -not only as absolute, but also as implicitly promising sufficiency, when needed, to help bridge the seemingly unbridgeable chasm between a Platonic world of abstract objects, and the real world of sensory perceptions, that sometimes confronts such disciplines! 4. The Halting probability
CCM's Thesis and the Halting problem
The significance of a constructive interpretation of classical concepts, as outlined above, Classically, there are two equivalent ways to look at the mathematical notion of proof: logical, as a finite sequence of sentences strictly obeying some axioms and inference rules, and computational, as a specific type of computation. Indeed, from a proof given as a sequence of sentences one can easily construct a Turing machine producing that sequence as the result of some finite computation and, conversely, given a machine computing a proof we can just print all sentences produced during the computation and arrange them into a sequence. Now, prima facie, the CCM Thesis seems equivalent to the Algorithmic Church Thesis, since it can be interpreted as implying that if an arithmetic function f(x) is algorithmically (Turing) computable, then, first, f is a mathematical object in PA and, second, the
It would then follow, by formal arguments that lie outside the immediate scope of this essay, that the Halting problem is effectively solvable; for, what we essentially argue there is that, given any Turing machine T, if there is an effective method to recognise whether or not a given arithmetical string P is a valid input of T, then a CCM Thesis should imply that there is an instantiational, non-algorithmic, effective method that will determine whether or not T will halt on input P.
An effective solution of the Halting problem
We reproduce this argument below.
Theorem 1:
The CCM Thesis implies that the Halting problem is effectively solvable. Since G(a, y) is recursive, it follows that there is some finite k such that any Turing machine T 2 (y) that computes the arithmetical function H(a, y) will halt, and return the symbol for self-termination (looping), for y = k. Thus, the Halting problem is effectively solvable if we assume a CCM Thesis.
Proof: Given a Turing machine that computes a number-theoretic function F(x)
,
Is the Halting probability a Dedekind real number?
Now, there are 2 k -1 possible digital strings of length k, which start with 1. If f(k) of these, when input to a given Universal Turing machine U, yield prefix-free Halting programs 20 , the classical probability that any randomly generated string of length k is prefix-free, and that it will halt, is "... Another source may lie in Turing's definition of an 'oracle-machine' which is a Turing machine allowed at certain points to 'consult the oracle'. Such a machine is not purely mechanical: it is like the 'choicemachine' defined in (Turing 1936-7) which at certain points allows for human choices to be made. Turing used the word 'machine' for entities which are only partially mechanical in operation, reserving the term 'automatic machine' for those which are purely mechanical. Copeland appears to imagine that when Turing describes the oracle-machine definition as giving a 'new type of machine', he is defining a new type of automatic machine. On the contrary, Turing is defining something only partially mechanical.
To take this point further, it is worth noting that the expression 'purely mechanical process' enters into Turing's definitive statement of the Church-Turing thesis, which comes as an opening section to (Turing 1939) , and that Turing goes on: 'understanding by a purely mechanical process one which could be carried out by a machine'. In the subsequent discussion the word 'machine' is used to mean 'Turing machine'. There is no evidence that Turing had any concept of a purely mechanical 'machine' of any kind other than encapsulated by the Turing machine definition."
The classical probability that any randomly generated string of length less than, or equal to, k is prefix-free, and that it will halt, is, thus
Since, by Theorem 1 above, we can determine f(i) for any given i, we can also determine HP U, i=<k as a rational number for any given k. It follows that the rational function HP U, i=<k (viewed as a number-theoretic function over ordered integer pairs), too, is, essentially, (Turing) uncomputable. Hence HP U is also not a mathematical object, and so its range does not define a set that can be assumed to determine a set-theoretically defined Dedekind real number.
However, since HP U, i=<k is, indeed, effectively computable individually for any given natural number k, we may look upon HP U as a random mathematical function that, nevertheless, contains an infinitude of non-algorithmically computable information. Solovay ... has constructed a self-delimiting universal Turing machine such that ZFC, 21 The significance of this may need to be viewed, however, in the light of earlier remarks in footnote 1. 22 Chaitin defines Omega, for a given Universal Turing machine U, as: Omega = SUM 2 -|p| over all prefix-free, binary, strings p on which U halts, where |p| is the length of the string p.
Standard interpretations of the significance of the Halting probability
However, when compared to the classical definition of probability considered earlier, and the value of Omega if we eliminate the prefix-free stipulation, it is not clear in which sense this sum can be termed as a probability that U will halt when its binary, prefix-free input is chosen randomly, e.g., by flipping a coin.
if arithmetically sound, cannot determine any single bit of its halting probability ... Rephrased, the most powerful formal axiomatic system is powerless when dealing with the questions of the form "is the m'th bit of Omega 0?" or "is the m'th bit of Omega 1?". Now, a point of some significance is that, since standard interpretations of classical theory do not explicitly distinguish between well-defined mathematical concepts and well-defined mathematical objects, the distinction between a non-constructively defined Chaitin real number (Omega), and a Dedekind real number (which provides the foundation for classical mathematical theory) remains implicit; it is thus not clear whether the significance ascribed to mathematical assertions about the former can be meaningfully, and significantly, extended to the latter 25 .
Are mechanistic proofs of mathematical problems logically sound?
In conclusion, we note that the pedantic point made by Robertson, Sanders, Seymour and Thomas, as quoted in ([Ca01], v2), about the reliability of their 1996 computer-generated proof of 4CT, can be seen as besieged sophistry:
However, an argument can be made that our "proof" is not a proof in the traditional sense, because it contains steps that can never be verified by humans. In particular, we have not proved the correctness of the compiler we compiled our programs on, nor have we proved the infallibility of the hardware we ran our programs on. These have to be taken on faith, and are conceivably a source of error. 25 Standard interpretations of classical mathematical theory ignore the possibility of such a distinction between Cantorian real numbers and Dedekind real numbers.
Although one may doubt whether their program is logically sound, there is no essential reason why such soundness cannot be established theoretically 26 ; thus, there is no sensible reason to doubt the output, even though the relation between a logically effective method and a mechanistic computation is, indeed, one of faith.
It is conceivable that an appropriately designed, and maintained, machine continuously calculating the digits of Pi may start outputting an unending series of zero's, perhaps for as long as a zillion years. Our belief that it will eventually output a digit other than zero comes about because of our faith that the machine is faithfully translating our theoretical calculations concerning the digits of Pi into a physical language of mechanical I/O devices; hence we believe, as an article of faith, and despite the physical evidence, that the series of zeros will not be unending.
Similarly, the effective solution of the Halting problem consists of a duo of parallel
Turing machines, where an assumption of a Uniform Church (or Turing / CCM) Thesis implies that one of the two will halt either because its program is a halting program, or because it recognises and halts due to an impending looping situation. Again, physically, this could take a zillion years in some particular case, and may call upon all our reserves of patience and faith.
So, finally, what we should place our faith in is our ability to intuitively "see" the soundness of our axiomatic assertions, and theses, at the lowest, and not, as some believe, at a sufficiently sophisticated, level of understanding. This, of course, is the distinguishing feature of, for instance, Dedekind's formulation of the Peano axioms, or - 26 Since every step of a formal proof sequence is either an axiom, or an immediate consequence of any two preceding elements of the sequence, each step can be effectively verified mechanistically by identifying the concerned axiom, or two preceding elements of the sequence. So long as each step is verified as logically sound, such a procedure need not be time bound, nor limited to the conceptual ability of any one individual to grasp, or even verify, the correctness of the entire proof.
as any high-school student can testify -Euclid's axioms for geometry; except the parallel postulate, these axioms are obvious to all, even if their consequences are not.
